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Will Re-armament 
Wreck the 
'Asian Miracle'? 
The Asian miracle faces two external threats, both 
related to re-armament. One is that the regional 
arms race will trigger open hostilities. The other is 
that renewed conflict in the Persian Gulf will trigger 
an oil crisis, choking Asia's energy-hungry 
economies. 
The immediate danger on both fronts is limited. In 
Asia, tangible 'peace dividends' from growth still far 
outweigh potential 'redistributional gains' from war, 
whereas in the Middle East the Arab-Israeli 
process remains on course. The long-run risks, 
however, are significantly greater. Asian growth will 
eventually decelerate, which implies a far thinner 
cushion to soften political disputes. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of 
the Cold War, disarmament and 'peace dividends' 
became fashionable topics. In his highly publicized 
book, The End of History and the Last Man, Francis 
Fukuyama announced that liberalism-capitalism-
democracy was the winning ideological combination 
to which the entire world is now bound to converge.1 
An alternative outlook was offered by Samuel 
Huntington, who argued that far from settling in 
peace, the world was heading toward a 'clash of 
civilizations,' with the eastern world and the Islamic 
countries pitted against the west.2 
It is too early to tell which view is right, but the 
answer is likely to depend on more than culture, 
ideology and politics. In matters of military spending 
and conflict, economics is no less important. 
Indeed, as illustrated in Chart 11-1, military spending 
began falling before the end of the Cold War - in 
the industrialized countries the downtrend 
commenced in 1988, whereas in the developing 
countries it started even earlier, during the early 
1980s. 
The very decision to end the Cold War was rooted, 
at least partly, in hard economics. As illustrated in 
Charts ll-2A and 11-28, during the 1980s, military 
1 Francis Fukuyama (1992) The End of History and the Last Man 
(New York: Free Press). 
2 See Samuel P. Huntington (1993) 'A Clash of Civilizations?' 
Foreign Affairs, 72(3); The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate 
(W.W. Norton, 1994); and The Clash of Civilization and the 
RemakingofWorldOrder(NewYork: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 
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spending by the Warsaw Pact was only 75% of 
NATO's, but this nevertheless absorbed up to 12% of 
its GDP compared with only 5% for NATO. These 
economic imbalances were crucial to the outcome of 
the Cold War. They also help explain why the 
countries of the former Warsaw Pact have curtailed 
their military spending by as much as 75% since the 
late 1980s, whereas NATO, despite its growing 
military superiority, cut it by only 15%. 
In the developing countries, most of the decline 
came from the Middle East, where military spending 
has dropped 56% since its 1983 peak. The main 
reason was falling oil revenues, suggesting that here 
too economics is no less important than politics. 
Although the data indicate that global military 
spending is still heading down, there is reason to 
believe the downturn is now close to bottoming out. 
In the industrial countries, the negative implications 
of further demilitarization for growth and employment 
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is already creating political pressure to stabilize 
military expenditures. And in the developing 
countries, where most actual conflicts are played 
out, some regions are already experiencing a revival 
of military spending. 3 
The main developments to watch are in Asia and in 
the Middle East. The first region is now the principal 
3 The industrial countries account for 80% of world military 
spending and as much as 93% of global military exports. 
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, however, of the 30 major armed conflicts waging around 
the world during 1995, none was in the industrial countries ( S/PRI 
Yearbook, 1996, Ch. 1). 
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The Peace Divided 
locomotive of the world economy, the second its 
energy lifeline. Hostilities or the threat of hostilities in 
any of these two regions therefore have major 
implications for investors. 
A farewell to arms? 
Clearly, the future of world arms is intimately tied to 
the course of military spending in the industrialized 
countries, particularly in the US. The first question, 
then, is whether the end of the Cold War is a 
farewell to arms. 
The tentative answer seems to be negative. The 
principal reason is the positive long-term relationship 
between military spending and economic growth 
(see Boxes 11-1 and 11-2 for why this may be the 
case). 
This relationship is illustrated in Chart 11-3, which 
contrasts US military expenditure as a share of GDP 
with the country's overall economic growth, both 
expressed as a 10-year moving average. During the 
first half of the century, spending on the military was 
highly 'cyclical' and related mainly to the two world 
wars. Since the 1950s, however, the US has 
maintained what President Eisenhower called the 
'military industrial complex,' with defense spending 
EMERGING MARKETS ANALYST 
Box 11-1 
How Does Military Spending Affect Growth? 
According to the great economist Joseph Schumpeter, 
military spending and empirH>uilding are antithetical 
to capitalism. The modem capitalist, he argued, 
benefited far more from peace than from war, and ·a 
purely capitalist world therefore can offer no fertile soil 
to imperialist impulses.' 1 However, the experience of 
the twentieth century suggests that military spending 
has been a pretty persistent 'aberration,' so the 
debate about it refuses to die. 
Conceptually, the effect on economic gn:JWlh of military 
spending has two distinct components. One comes 
from tts direct contribution to overall GDP growth, the 
other from the indirect impact on the country's civilian 
production growth. 
The first impact is readily observable. VVhether it adds 
to society's well being or not, mHitary spending is a 
component of GDP, so changes in its level affect 
overall growth. This impact is calculated simply by 
multiplying the rate of growth of the militaly sector by 
its overall share in GDP. 
The second impact is far more controversial. 2 One 
school of thought maintains that military spending has 
a positive effect on overall growth. This occurs through 
the •multiplier effect, 1 which means that income earned 
from government military spending raises overall 
consumer demand, particularly when the economy is in 
a slack. tn addition, military spending promotes 
kept permanently high, at least in comparison to the 
period prior the world wars. 
The significance of this long-term pattern for our 
purpose is its close correlation with growth. If there 
is indeed a causal link running from 
military expenditure to growth, the 
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modernization and technological know-how, boosts 
infrastructure spending and increases the sense of 
security and national cohesion, all of which tend to 
raise productivity in the civilian sector. These later 
influences are likely to be significant in the initial 
stages of development. The ear1y experience of 
countries such as Brazil, Korea. Israel, South Vetnam, 
the Soviet Union and Japan offers some credence to 
this view. 
Another school, however, argues that mHitary spending 
is a net burden on overaH growth. One reason is that 
such spending misallocates scarce resources. The 
other is that it heightens and undermines business 
confidence, thus leading to lower investment. This view 
is mostly applicable to the latter stage of economic 
development, as suggested by the subsequent 
experience of some of these very countries. 
However, because only the direct impact is readily 
obseNable, the overall growth implicaf10ns of military 
spending (direct and indirect) are much harder to 
determine. 
1 Joseph A. Schumpeter (1955) lmperis/lsm 8l1d Social Classes 
(New York: Meridian Books), p. 69. 
2 For a recent review of theory and evidence, see J.P. Dunne 
{1996) ·economic Effects of Military Expenditure in Developing 
Countries: A Survey: in N.P_ Gledttsch (ed.) The Peace Dividend 
(Amsterdam: North Holland). 
the OECD countries has trended down since the 
1960s, in Asia, it moved up, particularly since the 
mid 1980s. The divergence has become so 
pronounced, that although Asia accounts for only 
5% of the world's GDP, it currently generates over 
1/3rd of its annual growth. 
implication is that further cuts in 
military spending would push 
economic growth to unacceptably 
low levels. 
Political pressure to raise US military 
spending has grown in the last couple 
of years. Such pressure is bound to 
persist, but for the time being the risk 
World military 
spending is unlikely 
to go down much 
further ... 
This shift has a profound impact on 
western business in general and on 
US business in particular. US-based 
transnational corporations now derive 
up to 20% of their net income from 
subsidiaries located in developing 
countries, primarily in Asia (Chart 11-
5). 4 Moreover, the relative 
of this being translated into a major 
military buildup remains limited. The principal reason 
is the 'emerging-market boom' led by Asia. 
Rapid Asian growth should keep western 
re-armament pressures in check ... 
The growing significance of Asia is evident from 
Charts 11-4A and 11-48. While economic growth in 
EMERGING MARKETS ANALYST 
significance of US exports to 
developing countries in Asia has more than 
quadrupled - from less than 0.4% of GDP in the 
4 See 'US-Based Transnational Corporations and Emerging 
Markets,' in the July 1996 issue of the BCA £merging Markets 
Analyst. 
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early 1970s to over 1.6% presently (Chart 11-6). This 
development is particularly fortuitous for large US 
corporations which were previously dependent on 
domestic military spending, since declining arms 
sales could now be 'compensated' by rising Asian 
exports. In 1996, these exports have for the first time 
surpassed weapon sales to the Pentagon. 
Under these circumstances, where business 
prosperity in the US is decreasingly dependent on 
domestic growth, the pressure to raise military 
spending will remain muted. 
Thus, although western military spending is 
reaching a bottom, in the absence of a clear 
MARCH 1997 
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adversary and with Asia underwriting western profit 
growth, the industrial countries have no incentive 
for a new military buildup any time soon. 
... but the Asian arms race is in full swing 
The outlook for Asia is rather different. Just as it gets 
ready to enter the celebrated 'Pacific Century,' its 
economic 'miracle' looks increasingly entangled in 
security woes. The ghost of old conflicts is flaring-up 
again: a nuclear standoff between the two Koreas in 
1994, a China-Philippines confrontation over the 
Spratlys Islands in the South China Sea during 
1995, and dangerously real war games between 
China and Taiwan in 1995-96. 
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Such confrontations should not be too surprising, 
however. While elsewhere in the world military 
spending have been trending down, in Asia and the 
Pacific regions they are heading up (Chart 11-7). 
Part of this is a 'supply-side' phenomenon. East 
Asia's military burden, approximated by its share of 
military spending in GDP, is a mere 1.8%-
compared to the world's average of 3% and the 
slightly lower OECD average of 2.7%. This lighter 
load, combined with economic growth 3% times the 
world's average, make the purchase of military 
hardware far more 'affordable' in Asia than 
anywhere else. The 'demand-side,' however, is no 
less important. 
Asia's unstable geopolitics 
Many Asian countries feel they have good reasons 
to spend more on weapons. These reasons could be 
illustrated in reference to Chart 11-8. which plots for 
every country its actual military spending, alongside 
the level of spending 'commensurate' to its GDP. The 
latter is computed by multiplying the country's GDP 
by the world's average ratio of military spending to 
GDP, currently estimated at 3%. The results provide 
some indication of the main 'military disequilibria' 
besieging Asia. 
Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US Pacific 
Command assumed much of the responsibility for 
the security of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the 
ASEAN countries. But Russia as well as the US are 
now 'overburdened' by military spending (which still 
exceed 3% of their GDP by a wide margin), and with 
the risk of superpower confrontation gone, both are 
cutting their presence in Asia. 
Against this backdrop, the main regional worry is the 
rise of China. The latter maintains Asia's largest 
army (2.9 mn}, more than twice that of India, and is 
already the region's biggest military spender. 
However, China considers the US and Japan (rather 
than its immediate neighbors) to be its main 
adversaries, and relative to their military-
technological power, its still has a long way to go. 
This perceived threat, together with China's rapidly 
expanding GDP and relatively moderate military 
burden (2.4% of GDP), suggest that China's re-
armament will continue. 
The void created by declining US presence could in 
principle be filled by Japanese re-armament, though 
for the time being this is not in the cards. After the 
second word war, Japan's constitution put a 
spending cap on military spending equivalent to 1 % 
of GDP. Although small even by regional standards, 
combined with Japan's rapid economic growth in the 
EMERGING MARKETS ANALYST 
FEATURE ARTICLE 
Chart 11-7 
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1960s and 1970s, this proportion nevertheless 
enabled a rapid military buildup (Chart 11-7). In 
recent years, however, slower growth brought a 
sharp deceleration in military spending growth. 
The only alternative, therefore, is to remove the 
constitutional cap. According to unofficial sources, 
this has been done de facto by re-classifying some 
military-related spending, perhaps up to 0.5% of 
GDP, as civilian spending. Japan is also doing more 
intelligence gathering in Asia and has recently set up 
a spying agency with up to 2,000 new agents. And 
although nominally still at war, Japanese-Russian 
relations have been warming up recently, partly as 
an offset to the rise of China. 
However, the troubled history of Japanese 
occupation in Asia during the second world war 
creates strong reluctance, both outside and inside 
MARCH 1997 
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Boxll-2 
Does Growth Affect Military Spending? 
The impact of growth on military spending is no less 
controversial that that of military spending on growth. 
One channel of influence operates directly through the 
overan level of GDP. In the first instance, rapid growth 
enlarges the overall pie, thus making military spending 
more 'affordabJe.' This has clearly been the case in the 
Middte-East. where the ups and downs of the oil 
economies have been a principal determinant of 
military spending. as well as in Asia where 
phenomenal growth enables governments to channel 
significant sums to the purchase of new military 
hardware. Moreover, if growth works to alter the 
geopolitical standing of a country, it could also amplify 
the 'need' for higher military spending. This seems to 
have been the case in US during the first half of this 
century, in the Soviet Union during the second half of 
the century and in China and possibly India looking 
into the twenty-first century. The same influence may 
also work in reverse. After the second world war, 
Japan, to any formal move toward re-armament. 
J~pan's military prowess will therefore grow, but only 
piecemeal and more slowly than the region as a 
whole. 
And so, with no clear force countervailing China, the 
road for a regional arms race is now wide open. 
Most of the smaller countries in 
Britain was no longer able to afford hokfmg on to its 
empire; during the 1980s, the Soviet Union was losing 
its grip over Eastern Europe, while Russia is now 
forced to curtai1 its army; and with lower growth since 
the 1970s, the US too is finding it harder to meet its 
global military obligations. 
Under certain circumstances, however, growth could 
also work to curtail spending on the military, or at least 
Hmit their use in open conflict. This is mainly the case 
when growth comes together with free trade - such 
as the cr-eation of a single European market or the 
growing integration of the Asian economies. Under 
these tatter conditions, the Schumpeterian emphasis 
on the benefit of peace starts to kick in (see Box 11-1 ). 
Because it often heightens mutual animosity and fear, 
rising military spending could undermine investment 
and hence profit. Thus, as long as the potential loss of 
growth is sufficiently large, there will be significant 
pressure to keep military spending under control. 
the 'peace dividend' of the ending Cold War, and so 
although Asian conflict could seriously undermine 
western business interests there, the thirst for 
foreign military sales is so far proving far stronger. 
Political barriers on arms exports to the region are 
relatively minor, and Asian countries are now able to 
acquire most state-of-the-art military hardware. 
Watch those growth figures ... South East Asia - primarily 
ASEAN, South Korea, and Taiwan 
- already have their military 
spending at or above the world 
average of 3% of GDP (Chart 11-8), 
but few see an alternative to raising 
this burden even further. 
The Asian arms The rapid military buildup, together 
with Asia's numerous territorial 
disputes, suggest that the incidence 
of conflict could become more 
frequent. But there is a good reason 
to believe that, for the time being, 
such conflicts will not get out of 
hand. And the South-East Asian arms race is spilling over into South Asia. 
There, the principal conflict has long 
race continues, but 
economic growth 
keeps the lid on 
military conflict ... 
been the India-Pakistan dispute over the contested 
province of Jamu and Kashmir; although this dispute 
is now softened by liberalization in the two countries 
high military spending may well continue because of 
China. Partly due to the latter's nuclear capabilities, 
India (which fought two border wars with China), 
refuses to sign the non-proliferation treaty, which in 
turn puts pressure on Pakistan to maintain its own 
(unofficial) nuclear capabilities. 
Asia therefore continues to buy weapons, and the 
rest of the world, led by industrial countries, appears 
more than willing to supply them. Large segments of 
the western defense sector have been bled white by 
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The main reason is that conflict 
could spoil the benefits of growth which at this point 
are still too large to forego (Box 11-2). 
The Asian economies are growing more 
interdependent (Chart 11-9). A decade ago, trade 
with the industrialized countries still accounted for 
over 60% of the total, but this has since dropped by 
almost 10%, in favor of greater intra-regional activity 
which now accounts for over 37%. 
Notwithstanding this regional integration, external ties 
with the industrialized countries continue to intensify 
(Chart 11-10). From the industrialized countries' point 
of view, a rising share of their FDI is heading into 
Asia, while on the Asian side the domestic 
EMERGING MARKETS ANALYST 
Chart 11-8 
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significance of this FDI is approaching 3% of GDP, 
up from less than 0.5% only ten years ago. 
The internal and external integration of Asia means 
that the economic damage from local conflict could 
spread far beyond its point of origin. The implication 
is that third countries, both inside and outside of 
Asia, have a strong incentive to mediate a peaceful 
resolution for such conflicts before they get out of 
hand. 
Under these circumstances, the flare-up of local 
tension could create significant opportunities for alert 
investors: this has been the case in the wake of the 
Chart 11-9 
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1994 nuclear standoff in Korea, and following the 
China-Taiwan war games in 1996.5 
How long this environment of 'militarization-without-
war' can continue is of course difficult to tell. 
However, since the interest in reconciliation is 
intimately related to the perceived benefits from 
growth, investors can use simple rough-and-ready 
indicators to assess the risk of these expectations 
turning sour. 
Chart 11-11 provides two such indicators. One 
indicator is the ratio of FDI to profit remittances. By 
measuring how much foreign investors are pouring 
into the region relative to how much they are taking 
out of it, this ratio provides a barometer for long-term 
business expectations. Standing at 6: 1, this ratio is 
currently way above the developing countries' 
average of 3.4: 1, and is still rising. 
However, because the FOi-to-remittances ratio is 
available only with a lag, it is useful to have a leading 
indicator for it. Such indicator is provided by the 
long-term moving average of Asia's growth 
differential vis a vis the world economy. Although 
investors are forward-looking, much of their future 
outlook is shaped by past experience. This means 
that long-term expectations tend to respond only 
5 EMA subscribers have been alerted to the 'nuclear opportunity' 
in Korea in our April 1994 issue. The investment opportunity in 
Taiwan was picked up by our Phoenix model during its inception in 
October 1995 and elaborated in the Taiwan Quarterly a month 
later. 
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Chart 11-10 
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Chart 11-11 
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gradually to changing circumstances, and with a 
considerable lag. 
The correlation, evident in Chart 11-11, between the 
long-term investment mood (proxied by the FOi/ 
remittances ratio) and the growth differential 
underlying it, seems to confirm this logic. The 
contours of this correlation lead to two tentative 
conclusions: 
( 1) Given that the leading growth-differential indicator 
is still edging up, for the next decade or so long term 
expectations will likely remain high. Therefore, 
although militarization may well continue, the risk of 
this triggering open hostilities will remain limited. 
(2) Beyond this time range, however, all bets are off. 
Sooner or later, some Asian economies will begin to 
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Chart 11-12 
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'mature,' and as this feeds into a smaller growth 
differential, the dividends from peace may prove too 
small to offset the winds of war. Of course, given that 
in many parts of Asia- most notably India - the 
urbanization process is still in its early stage, this 
maturation could still be far off.6 
However, Asia's growth is vulnerable to an external 
shock which could come much earlier. 
The Middle-East energy link 
One possible trigger for such shock is another 
energy crisis. As illustrated in Chart 11-12, over the 
past quarter century, Asia's dependency on oil has 
risen sharply relative to the OECD. In 1970, Asian 
countries spent 17% more on energy for every dollar 
worth of GDP than did the OECD countries. But 
following the capital-intensive industrialization of the 
former and the gradual transition to labor-intensive 
services in the latter, the difference has risen to 
116% presently. 
Now, as Table 11-1 indicates, Asia is highly 
dependent on imported oil. Thus, with the possible 
exception of Indonesia and Malaysia, most countries 
in the region will likely see their competitiveness 
eroded sharply in the event of an oil crisis. 
This risk is illustrated in Chart 11-13, which relates 
Asia's trade deficit, expressed as a percent of its 
6 On the significance of urbanization for the growth process, see 
'Can Brazil continue to outperform India?' in the December 1996 
issue of the BCA Emerging Markets Analyst. 
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Table 11-1 
Oil Production, Consumption and Surplus (1995) 
Production Consumption Surplus +/-
(mn tons/year) (mn tons/year) (%) 
Australia 25.1 35.2 -29% 
China 149.0 157.5 -5% 
India 37.1 67.6 -45% 
Indonesia 73.8 38.6 +91% 
Japan 267.3 -100% 
Malaysia 34.9 20.0 +75% 
New Zealand 5.6 -100% 
Pakistan 15.3 -100% 
Philippines 16.8 -100% 
Singapore 26.9 -100% 
South Korea 94.8 -100% 
Taiwan 35.4 -100% 
Thailand 33.3 -100% 
Source: BP 
overall trade (exports plus imports), with the annual 
change in the price of crude oil (lagged one year). 
The tight correlation between the two series exists 
because higher oil prices make Asian exports less 
competitive, while at the same time raising its import 
bill. 
In general, the overall effect of rising oil prices tends 
to be stagflationary. it chokes the economy by 
slowing the export sector, while concurrently putting 
upward pressure on prices by 
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According to estimates published by the OECD's 
International Energy Agency (IEA) and the US 
Energy Information Administration (EIA), rising 
demand for oil could require production levels in 
2005 to be as much as 1/3rd higher than presently. 
This translates to an additional 17 mn/bbl per day 
over today's level of 68 mn/bbl. Based on these 
estimates and on the geographical distribution of 
existing oil reserves, the US Congressional Research 
Service suggests that much of this new capacity will 
have to come from the Middle East. 7 However, oil 
producers there plan to raise their daily capacity by 
only 6.5 mn/bbl. Moreover, even that 
weakening the currency and by 
pushing up the cost of energy. 
Because of Asia's higher energy 
intensity, the stagflationary effect 
tends to be stronger there than in 
the industrial countries. This makes 
the price of oil a good leading 
indicator for the relative 
performance of Asian emerging 
equity markets against those of the 
... An oil crisis 
triggered by war in 
the Middle East 
is uncertain given the estimated 
$120 bn price tag which the cash-
hungry Persian Gulf countries may 
find difficult to raise. If this excess-
demand scenario unfolds, the result 
may be a genuine oil shortage. 
could derail the However, past experience suggests 
that proven oil reserves and 
production facilities are very Asian locomotive. 
industrial countries (Chart 11-14). 
Thus, Asian equity prices suffered disproportionately 
following the brief oil price spike of the 1990/1 Gulf 
War, and were undermined again by the firming of 
oil prices since 1995. Clearly, if oil prices continue 
to move up, or if there is a new oil crisis, Asia is in 
for a rough ride. 
How likely is such a crisis? Again, although this is 
difficult to answer, certain considerations are worth 
noting. 
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responsive to higher prices, while 
demand growth could be significantly affected by 
greater energy efficiency and alternative energy 
sources. Indeed, the facts of the matter are that the 
7 See J.P. Riva Jr., 'Wor\d Oi\ Production After "fear 2000: 
Business As Usual or Crises?' Congressional Research Service, 
Report to Congress, August, 1995. 
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world is yet to experience an energy crisis due to a 
real shortfall of oil. 
The more important risk is political-economic in 
nature. Note that all three energy crises of the post-
war era where associated with military conflicts in 
the Middle-East: the 1967 and 1973 Israel-Arab 
wars, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and the 
1980 onset of the Iraq-Iran War. In all three cases, 
the principal fear driving oil prices was not of a 
physical shortage of oil, but of a politically-imposed 
one. 
With the end of the Cold War, the Middle East is no 
longer a theater of superpower confrontation, and 
regional tensions could ease further as the Israeli-
Arab peace process proves sustainable. However, a 
decade of depressed oil prices has heightened 
internal strife in the Persian Gulf, particularly in 
Saudi Arabia. Although petroleum prices have 
recovered over the past year, re-establishing political 
stability may require prices to remain high for a 
much longer period. In the interim, crisis could 
return and without much prior notice. 
8 For more on the Middle East outlook, see 'Israel and South 
Africa: Prospects for their transitions,' in the February 1996 issue 
of the BCA Emerging Markets Analyst, and 'The Middle East: 
Another reversal of expectations?,' in the January 1997 issue. 
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Also, oil prices could be adversely affected by 
political developments in Asia. Indonesia, a large oil 
producer, is undergoing a succession period whose 
outcome is highly uncertain. And many of Asia 
regional disputes - most notably those in the 
Spratlys Islands- are directly related to oil. 
Investment Conclusions 
•World military spending is close to a bottom. 
Further declines in the US will be detrimental to 
growth and are therefore unlikely. However, a new 
military buildup is also not in the cards as long as 
Asian economic growth keeps fueling US profits. 
• The gradual withdrawal of Russia and the US from 
Asia is creating a power vacuum. The major 
geopolitical disequilibrium arises because China is 
re-arming rapidly, while for political reasons, Japan 
can do so only very slowly. The smaller countries 
therefore have no choice but build up their own 
arsenal. 
• For the next decade or so, however, open conflict 
could well be averted. Because the 'peace dividends' 
from rapid Asian growth remain far larger than the 
're-distributional gains' from war, third countries 
outside and inside the region have a significant 
interest in peaceful conflict resolution. 
•An environment of 'militarization-without-war' is 
therefore likely to persist for the next decade or so. 
Under these circumstances, bear markets triggered 
by local tensions could offer significant contrarian 
opportunities for investors. 
•The longer-term outlook is more uncertain. Asia's 
military arsenals are growing, and as its economies 
begin to mature and growth starts to tatter, conflict 
will intensify while the imperative to resolve it 
peacefully weakens. 
• Finally, the Asian economies are energy-intensive 
and for the most part depended on imported oil. This 
makes their trade balance, currencies and equity 
markets highly vulnerable to an oil crisis. The main 
risk for such crisis is military conflict in the Middle 
East or political instability in other oil producing 
regions, although the magnitude and timing of such 
risk are difficult to determine. 
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